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This paper investigates the impact of population aging, driven by medical progress, upon age-
specific expenditure on health care. In a model set up in discrete time, individuals at each age 
may catch a lethal disease which, upon receiving appropriate medical treatment, nevertheless 
involves a mortality risk such that length of life is stochastic. The incidence of lethal diseases, 
the associated survival probability conditional upon treatment, and health care expenditure 
conditional upon health status may all depend on an individual´s history. For a given age, the 
history of an individual contains information on her health status in the past.  
 
Medical progress is taken to involve an increase in the survival probability of a specified le-
thal disease. On the one hand, this produces a direct effect on age-specific health care expen-
diture to the extent that progress affects the cost of treatment of the disease. On the other 
hand, indirect effects may also arise. These effects are caused by individuals who, having sur-
vived the disease at some prior age due to progress, change the structure of individuals alive 
at current age. Specifically, the “new survivors” may have an influence on age-specific ex-
penditure either through changes in the incidence of lethal diseases or in the associated treat-
ment cost. The sign of an indirect effect crucially depends on health care expenditure for 
“new survivors” relative to their peers. 
 
The analysis yields a number of general results which are important for the discussion of the 
impact of medical progress on the age profile of health care expenditure. Compression of 
morbidity, to the extent that it involves a reduction in age-specific expenditure, is neither nec-
essary nor sufficient for medical progress to produce a downward shift of the profile. A simi-
lar observation applies to an expansion of morbidity. Both concepts relate to “new survivors” 
and, thus, take into account only indirect effects of progress. 
 
 
JEL classification:   I12, J11, O33 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Aging of the population is a well-known phenomenon currently under way in most developed 
countries. A declining overall birth rate, coupled with reductions in age-specific mortality 
rates, has fuelled a process of double aging over the last decades which led to substantial 
changes in the age composition of the population. It seems safe to assume that this process 
will carry on in the future.
1 In particular, advances in medical technology are projected to re-
duce age-specific mortality further and particularly so in higher age classes. 
 
What is the impact of an aging population on the demand for health care and on health care 
expenditure? A substantial body of research has evolved in the recent past in order to address 
these issues.
2 The answers are important not only for the future evolution of the health care 
system but also for the financing and, in particular, the sustainability of social health insur-
ance. 
 
The traditional approach to forecasting health care expenditures under conditions of demo-
graphic change is simple: A given expenditure profile, i.e., a vector of age-specific health care 
expenditure, preferably containing most recent data, is combined with the age structure of the 
population as projected for a future year.
3 Thus, one obtains health care expenditure in a fu-
ture year, with the change to the current year being due to demographic change by itself.
4 
More specifically, since cross-sectional data indicate that age-specific expenditure rises 
sharply with age, the approach implies aging of the population to produce an increase in per 
capita expenditure.  
 
However, the traditional approach has come under attack for being naïve.
5 Essentially, the 
main criticism runs as follows: Aging of the population cannot occur by itself but must relate 
to a cause, e.g., medical progress, an increase in preventive activities through better lifestyles 
or some other reason. Now any factor which has an influence upon the age structure is also 
likely to produce changes in age-specific expenditure on health care, albeit in a less obvious 
manner.
6 If that is true, both the significance and the usefulness of the traditional approach 
may be questioned. 
 
Medical progress provides a staple example. Advances in medical technology may lead to 
reductions in the mortality of patients from specific conditions, thus contributing to or even 
driving the process of population aging. This raises two issues which are relevant for the im-
pact on age-specific health care expenditure. First, the change in treatment strategy may affect 
the cost of treatment.
7 Second, increases in longevity produce “new survivors” who may con-
sume different amounts of health care in comparison with their peers. 
 
                                                 
1 For the OECD countries cf. Lafortune et al. (2007), S. 11ff. For Germany, cf. Federal Statistical Office (2006). 
2 Surveys are provided by Newhouse (1992), Technical Review Panel (2000) and Westerhout (2006). 
3 E.g., cf. Abel-Smith/Titmuss (1956) for an early application, as well as Dang et al. (2001). 
4 Cf. Reinhardt (2003: 30). 
5 Cf. Breyer/Felder (2006). 
6 This is certainly true of the two factors just mentioned. For a general analysis along these lines, cf. Richardson 
(2004). 
7 Cf. Technical Review Panel (2000: pp. 28-37).   4
For the second issue, the literature offers competing views with respect to the impact on the 
expenditure profile. According to Fries, the rise in length of life mainly provides an individual 
with additional healthy time. Thus, medical progress involves a compression of morbidity 
over the – extended – life-cycle such that a decline in age-specific morbidity comes about.
8 
Taking the opposite stance, Gruenberg and Verbrugge suggested that increases in life expec-
tancy primarily will be spent as sick time.
9 In their view, medical progress leads to an expan-
sion of morbidity, producing a rise in age-specific morbidity. 
 
As time elapses, the two views can be taken to imply shifts of the health care expenditure pro-
file which occur in opposite direction. The available empirical evidence on this issue appears 
to be mixed. To some extent, improvements in age-specific health status seem to have taken 
place.




Another line of argument stresses the significance of time to death rather than age.
12 The “cost 
of dying” approach is based on the observation that, for each age, per capita expenditure on 
health care for decedents by far exceeds the corresponding expenditure for survivors.
13 As the 
population ages, the relative number of decedents at each age will decline. Hence, ceteris 
paribus population aging tends to reduce age-specific expenditure on health care. In recent 
years, several projections have taken this effect into account, yielding lower expenditure fig-
ures than the traditional approach.
14  
 
The main objective of the present paper is to investigate the impact of medical progress on 
age-specific health care expenditure by means of a theoretical model. More specifically, pro-
gress is taken to reduce mortality and, thus, to drive the process of population aging. In con-
trast to the bulk of the literature, however, health care expenditure is linked explicitly to 
health status. More precisely, the following analysis relies on the simple notion that the treat-
ment decision can only depend on information which is available at the time a decision must 
be taken: An individual´s current health status and possibly his history of health status in prior 
periods as well. A similar statement applies to expenditure on health care.  
 
Therefore, at any age, per capita expenditure on health care depends on the distribution of 
health status and the associated treatment cost. It follows that the model is able to capture 
both effects of medical progress on age-specific expenditure mentioned above. In particular, 
changes in the distribution of health status due to the presence of “new survivors” in later pe-
riods are taken into account. 
 
                                                 
8 Cf. Fries (1980), Fries (1983) and Fries (2000). 
9 Cf. Gruenberg (1977), Verbrugge (1984). 
10 Cf. Dinkel (1999), Cutler (2001), Busse et al. (2002). 
11 Cf. Technical Review Panel (2000), Reinhardt (2003), Buchner/Wasem (2006). In some contrast, Seshamani 
and Gray show that this has not been true for England and Wales, cf. Seshamani/Gray (2004). 
12 Cf. Fuchs (1984), Zweifel et al. (1999), Stearns/Norton (2004), Breyer/Felder (2006), Werblow et al. (2007). 
13 The only exception being very old age, i.e., ages above 85 or even 90 years. 
14 Cf. Stearns/Norton (2004), Breyer/Felder (2006).   5
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. In section 3, after 
a description of medical progress, I derive two kinds of effects on age-specific expenditure on 
health care. Section 4 gives a discussion of the results while the last section concludes. 
 
 
2  The model 
2.1  Building blocks 
 
This section sets up a model which will serve later to analyze the impact of medical progress. 
The focus is on mortality, i.e. morbidity-related health outcomes will not be addressed explic-
itly. In each period of calendar time, members of a new generation are born who may live for 
a maximum number of Ω periods. Actual length of life is stochastic, however, because an 
individual faces a mortality risk in each period. This probability of dying is generated by two 
factors of influence: The probability of catching a lethal disease, i.e. a disease which involves 
a certain risk of dying, and the probability that the patient does not survive appropriate medi-
cal treatment. 
 
A basic assumption is that the important variables of interest do not change over time. Hence, 
a long-term view is adopted which relates to a stationary state such that members belonging to 
different generations all face the same parameter values over their lifetime. It follows that, 
when referring to a member of a particular generation, it suffices to specify her age while it is 
not necessary to account for calendar time explicitly.  
 
As explained in the introduction, the main objective is to model age-specific expenditures on 
health care. Therefore, it is not necessary to account for the number of births or the number of 
individuals within a cohort over time. 
 
Each individual is born at the beginning of a period and will die either at the end of the first or 
some later period. As mentioned above, lifetime T of a member of a generation will be taken 
not to exceed an upper bound Ω:
15  
(1)  Ω ≤ ≤T 1 . 
 
At each age, an individual may catch a lethal disease. In total, there are n such diseases. 
Moreover, it is also possible that no lethal disease occurs. Hence, an individual´s health status 
within a period t of her lifetime can be represented by a variable  t D  which satisfies: 
(2)       { } Ω ≤ ≤ ∈ + t d d d D t n t n t t 1 ; ; ;...; , 1 , , 1 . 
Specifically,  t j d ,  denotes the event that health status  j d  turns up at age t. More precisely, for 
n j ≤ ≤ 1  the index j is taken to indicate a lethal disease whereas  1 + n d  denotes the absence of 
such a disease. Note that the latter status may also involve a disease albeit one that never re-
sults in the death of the individual. 
                                                 
15 Ω can be interpreted as an upper bound upon length of life imposed by biological limitations, cf. Fries (1980), 
p. 130f.   6
An important feature of the model is that previous lethal diseases may exert an impact on the 
individual as well as on health care expenditure at a later age. To be sure, this presupposes 
that medical treatment of those diseases has been successful. More specifically, the history of 
an individual contains information upon her health status at each prior age. For a later life 
period t, the set  t H  of all histories of an individual who is still alive is given by: 
(3a)       1 2 1 ... − ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ = t t D D D H . 
A specific history  t h  is an element of the set  t H  which can be represented by a vector of di-
mension t-1.
16 Its i-th component  i t h ,  denotes health status at a prior age i. Furthermore, let 
[] 1 , , − − t i t h  denote the first i-1 components of the vector  t h . Intuitively, the vector  [] 1 , , − − t i t h  repre-
sents that part of an individual´s history  t h  which includes the first periods of her life up to 
period i-1: 
(3b)       []( ) 1 , 2 , 1 , 1 , , ... − − − = i t t t t i t h h h h . 
 
The next task is to define the incidences of lethal diseases as well as the corresponding sur-
vival probabilities. With respect to lifetime, observe that the first and the last period Ω repre-
sent special cases, albeit for different reasons. In the first period, by definition no history is 
available for an individual. On the other hand, lifetime cannot exceed Ω by assumption. An-
other assumption is that an individual always receives medical care as is appropriate for his 
health status. Specifically, in the case of lethal disease, the associated survival probability 
always reflects the prevailing state of medical knowledge. 
 
In the first period, the incidences of lethal diseases satisfy: 
(4a)     () () 1 ; 1 ; 1 0
1




k k d n k d ρ ρ . 
This implies for the probability of the absence of such a disease: 
(4b)       () ( ) 0 1
1





k n d d ρ ρ . 
If a lethal disease strikes, there is a mortality risk whereas the complementary state  1 , 1 + n d  in-
volves no such risk:  






≤ ≤ 〈 〈
n k d e




In every later period, survivors exhibit a history which may influence both the incidence of 
health status and the probabilities of survival in the case of a lethal disease. As long as the last 
period is not reached, it is again possible that no lethal disease turns up. For every history 
t t H h ∈ , the incidences of the lethal diseases are taken to satisfy: 
(5a)   () () 1 2 ; 1 ; ,..., 1 ; 1 0
1
, , − Ω ≤ ≤ 〈 = 〈 〈 ∑
=
t h d n k h d
n
k
t t k t t k ρ ρ . 
                                                 
16 Observe that  Ω ≤ ≤ t 2  must hold because no history exists in the first period of life.   7
This implies for the probability of the absence of such a disease: 
(5b)   () () 1 2 ; 0 1
1
, , 1 − Ω ≤ ≤ 〉 − = ∑
=
+ t h d h d
n
k
t t k t t n ρ ρ . 
Likewise, the survival probabilities now depend on the history of prior health status but oth-
erwise are restricted in the same manner as in the first period: 






, − Ω ≤ ≤
=




n k h d e
t t n
t t k . 
 
In the last period, the assumptions require some modification for reasons of consistency. 
More precisely, each individual will be taken to catch a lethal disease which she cannot sur-
vive. Thus, for every  Ω Ω ∈H h , the incidences of the lethal diseases satisfy: 
(6a)   () () 1 ; ,..., 1 ; 1 0
1
, , = = 〈 〈 ∑
=
Ω Ω Ω Ω
n
k
k k h d n k h d ρ ρ . 
In addition, the restriction on the associated survival probabilities is given by: 
(6b)       ( ) n k h d e k ≤ ≤ = Ω Ω 1 ; 0 , . 




For a description of the distribution of health status in a later period t, it is also necessary to 
take into account the conditional probabilities of the possible histories. More precisely, the 
condition is given by survival up to the period under consideration. Obviously, these prob-
abilities can be calculated by means of the parameters introduced above. More specifically, 
one obtains for the probability of a history  t t H h ∈  (with  2 ≥ t ): 
(7a)     () () () [] ( ) [] ( ) ∏
−
=
− − − − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =
1
2
1 , , , 1 , , , 1 , 1 ,
t
i
t i t i t t i t i t t t t h h e h h h e h h P ρ ρ . 
In all, there are ()
1 1
− +
t n  histories relating to a period t. The probability of survival up to this 
period is given by: 
(7b)       ( ) ( ) ∑
∈
= ≥
t t H h
t h P t T P . 
Applying Bayes´ theorem, the conditional probability of a history is defined by: 
(7c)       () ( )
() t T P
h P
t T h P
t
t ≥
= ≥ . 
This is the probability that an individual who survives up to the present period t has the his-
tory  t h . 
 
                                                 
17 The assumptions introduced so far imply constant age-specific mortality rates. If, in addition, age-specific 
birth rates are constant as well and no migration occurs, the population converges to a stable age structure in the 
long run, cf. Mueller (2000). For the analysis below, however, it is not necessary to impose further restrictions.   8
Observe that these conditional probabilities are very important for a description of the distri-
bution of the relevant variables with respect to age. Consider the incidence of health status in 
a later period t. The probability of a history  t t H h ∈  and a health status  k d  is given by: 
(8a)       () ( ) ( ) t t k t t t k h d t T h P t T h d P , , ; ρ ⋅ ≥ = ≥ . 
This implies for the overall incidence at age t: 
(8b)   () () ( ) ( ) ∑ ∑
∈ ∈
≥ ⋅ = ≥ = ≥
t t t t H h
t t t k
H h
t t k t k t T h P h d t T h d P t T d , , , ; ρ ρ . 
The probabilities  () t T d t k ≥ , ρ  are similar to the incidences  ( ) 1 , k d ρ  for the first period. How-
ever, as (8b) shows, in a later period it is necessary to take into account the structure of indi-
viduals with respect to history. 
 
In the first period, expenditure on health care only depends on current health status and is de-
noted by  ( ) 1 , k d L . In a later period t, history may become relevant. Let  ( ) t t k h d L ,  denote health 
care expenditure for an individual with health status  k d  conditional upon history  t h . 
 
 
2.2  Age-specific expenditure on health care  
 
In general, the age profile of expenditure on health care in the present model is derived from 
expected expenditure in each period. For the first period, this is given by:
18  
(9a)       () () () 1 ,
1
1
1 , 1 1 k
n
k
k d L d L E ∑
+
=
⋅ = ρ . 
In every later period, the structure of individuals with respect to history needs to be taken into 
account as well. For expected health care expenditure, conditional upon a given history, one 
obtains: 
(9b)       () () () t t k
n
k






⋅ = ρ . 
This implies for expected health care expenditure in a later period: 
(9c)       () ( ) ( ) ∑
∈
⋅ ≥ =
t t H h
t t t t t t t h L E t T h P H L E . 
 
In order to prepare for the analysis of medical progress below, it is useful to consider several 
ways of decomposing expected health care expenditure for a later period t. This is done by 
adding further conditions, apart from survival up to that period. What does this imply for the 
incidence of health status and expected health care expenditure at the current age? Since the 
values of these variables, conditional upon history, are given by assumption, an influence may 
operate only through a change in the conditional probabilities of the histories themselves. 
                                                 
18 The subscript „t“ is added to the expectation operator to indicate that expected value is taken at the beginning 
of period t, i.e., before current health status is revealed.   9
Suppose an individual of age t has survived the lethal disease m in a prior period j. This im-
plies that her history satisfies  j m j t d h , , = . The total probability that a history relating to the 
current age t satisfies this condition is given by: 
(10a)     ( ) ( ) ∑
=
∈
≥ = ≥ =




t j m j t t T h P t T d h P
, ,
, , . 
Applying Bayes´ theorem, one obtains for the conditional probability of a history which in-
cludes the lethal disease m in the prior period j: 
(10b)     () ( )
() t T d h P
t T h P
d h t T h P
j m j t
t




, , ; . 
Any other history satisfies the complementary condition  j m j t d h , , ≠  and, thus, cannot occur as 
long as one imposes  j m j t d h , , = . 
 
Given the additional condition  j m j t d h , , = , the incidence of health status in the current period 
is defined by: 
(10c)  ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 ; ; ;
, ,
, , , , , , + ≤ ≤ = ≥ ⋅ = = ≥ ∑
=
∈
n k d h t T h P h d d h t T d




j m j t t t t k j m j t t k ρ ρ . 
In turn, this implies for expected health care expenditure at age t: 
(10d)   ( ) ( ) ( ) ∑
=
∈
⋅ = ≥ = =




t t t j m j t t j m j t t t t h L E d h t T h P d h H L E
, ,
, , , , ; ; . 
 
Likewise, for an individual of age t who did not catch the lethal disease m in a prior period j, 
one obtains for the total probability of her history satisfying the condition that the lethal dis-
ease did not turn up in a prior period j: 
(11a)     () ( ) ∑
≠
∈
≥ = ≥ ≠




t j m j t t T h P t T d h P
, ,
, , . 
Then, Bayes´ theorem implies for the conditional probability of a history which does not in-
clude the lethal disease m in the prior period j: 
(11b)     () ( )
() t T d h P
t T h P
d h t T h P
j m j t
t




, , ; . 
Any other history satisfies the complementary condition  j m j t d h , , =  and, thus, cannot occur as 
long as one imposes  j m j t d h , , ≠ . 
 
Given the additional condition  j m j t d h , , ≠ , the incidence of health status in the current period 
is defined by: 
(11c)  ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 ; ; ;
, ,
, , , , , , + ≤ ≤ ≠ ≥ ⋅ = ≠ ≥ ∑
≠
∈
n k d h t T h P h d d h t T d




j m j t t t t k j m j t t k ρ ρ .   10
In turn, this implies for expected health care expenditure at age t: 
(11d)   ( ) ( ) ( ) ∑
≠
∈
⋅ ≠ ≥ = ≠




t t t j m j t t j m j t t t t h L E d h t T h P d h H L E
, ,
, , , , ; ;.  
 
Consider an individual of age t. Clearly, her history either satisfies  j m j t d h , , =  or the comple-
mentary condition  j m j t d h , , ≠ . Thus, expected health care expenditure for all individuals of 
that age,  () t t t H L E , just represents the average of expected expenditure for those two groups. 
Indeed, relying on the definitions above, one obtains the following decomposition: 
(12)     () t t t H L E  
     () ( ) ( ) ( ) j m j t t t t j m j t j m j t t t t j m j t d h H L E t T d h P d h H L E t T d h P , , , , , , , , ; ; ≠ ⋅ ≥ ≠ + = ⋅ ≥ = = . 
 
Alternatively, a particular health state in the current period may act as an additional condition. 
Applying Bayes´ theorem again, one obtains for the probability of a history  t t H h ∈  under the 
condition that current health status is given by  t k d , : 
(13a)     () ( ) ( )
() t T d
h d t T h P
d t T h P
t k
t t k t









Thus, the corresponding expected expenditure on health care is defined by: 
(13b)     ( ) ( ) ( ) ∑
∈
⋅ ≥ =
t t H h
t t k t k t t k t t t h d L d t T h P d H L E , , , ; ;.  
For the special case k=n+1, one obtains  ( ) t n t t t d H L E , 1 ; + , i.e. expected health care expenditure 
for individuals who do not catch a lethal disease in the current period. In sum, (13b) leads to 
the following decomposition of expected expenditure on health care relating to age t: 









t k t t t t k t t t d H L E t T d H L E ρ . 
 
In general, it is useful to take into account the incidence of a lethal disease m for which pro-
gress will be available later on. Moreover, it is also worthwhile to consider the composite 
event  t m d ,  explicitly. For the probability of this event which is complementary to  t m d , , one 
has: 











, , 1 ρ ρ ρ . 
This implies for the incidence of a health status other than  t m d ,  in the current period under the 
additional condition  t m d , :   11










































Combining these conditional incidences with expected expenditure on health care according 
to (13b), one obtains expected health care expenditure for individuals who do not catch the 
lethal disease m at current age: 







t k t t t t m t k t m t t t d H L E d t T d d H L E
1
, , , , ; ; ; ρ . 
This provides another decomposition of total expected health care expenditure: 
(15b)     () t t t H L E  
   () ( ) ( ) ( ) t m t t t t m t m t t t t m d H L E t T d d H L E t T d , , , , ; ; ⋅ ≥ + ⋅ ≥ = ρ ρ . 
 
Finally, consider individuals who have survived the lethal disease m in the prior period and 
will experience a particular health state in the current period. Observe that this involves a 
combination of the two types of conditions investigated above. Again, Bayes´ theorem yields 
the probability of a history  t t H h ∈  relating to a later period t given that  j m j t d h , , =  holds and 
current health status will be equal to  t k d , :
19  
(16a)   () ( ) ( )
() j m j t t k
t t k j m j t t
t k j m j t t d h t T d
h d d h t T h P
d d h t T h P
, , ,
, , ,









Under these conditions, expected expenditure on health care at age t is equal to: 
(16b)   ( ) ( ) () ∑
=
∈
⋅ = ≥ = =




t t k t k j m j t t t k j m j t t t t h d L d d h t T h P d d h H L E
, ,
, , , , , , , ; ; ; ; . 
For k=n+1, one obtains  ( ) t n j m j t t t t d d h H L E , 1 , , ; ; + = , i.e. expected health care expenditure for 
individuals who survived the lethal disease m in the prior period j and do not catch a lethal 
disease in the current period. Taken together, (16b) leads to a further decomposition of ex-
pected expenditure on health care at age t: 
(16c)  () () ( ) ∑
+
=
= ⋅ = ≥ = =
1
1
, , , , , , , , ; ; ; ;
n
k
t k j m j t t t t j m j t t k j m j t t t t d d h H L E d h t T d d h H L E ρ . 
 
 
                                                 
19 Of course, this applies only to histories which satisfy  j m j t d h , , = .   12
3.  Long-term effects of medical progress on age-specific health care expenditure  
3.1  Medical progress  
In what follows, medical progress is taken to improve the ability to treat a lethal disease such 
that the associated survival probabilities increase in every period except for the final period Ω. 
As demonstrated below, this implies an increase in the probability of survival up to every later 
period. Hence, medical progress leads to an increase in life expectancy at birth but maximum 
length of life remains as before. 
 
More specifically, the assumption is that progress occurs with respect to treatment of the le-
thal disease m. In the first period of life, it brings about a relative increase in the survival 
probability relating to that disease as stated by the following condition  1 A : 
(17a)       ( ) [ ]
()
0 : 1 ,
1 ,
1 ,






Additionally, in each later period t up to Ω-1, condition  t A  implies the relative increase in the 
survival probability associated with the lethal disease m not to depend on an individual´s his-
tory: 
(17b)     () []
()
1 2 ; 0 : ,
,
, − Ω ≤ ≤ ∈ ∀ 〉 = t H h a
h d e
h d e d





All other exogenous probabilities of the model remain unchanged. Therefore, medical pro-
gress has no effect upon the incidence of lethal diseases conditional upon history. Similarly, 
the associated survival probabilities for every other lethal disease do not change. 
 
In comparison with the original stationary state, progress in the long term has an impact upon 
the structure of individuals with respect to history. First, for given probabilities of the histo-
ries, a reduction in age-specific mortality occurs in every period except for Ω. These changes 
reflect the direct effects of medical progress on mortality. As a result of a direct effect operat-
ing in a period t, more individuals will be alive in the following period and possibly in further 
periods as well. A characteristic of these “new survivors” is that their history contains the 
lethal disease m in some prior period. Hence, the structure of individuals with respect to his-
tory will also change due to medical progress. In turn, this gives rise to a second type of ef-
fects, i.e., indirect effects upon age-specific mortality which may turn up in every period t 
with  Ω ≤ ≤ t 2 .  
 
In general, the improvement in treatment capability brought about by progress will also affect 
the associated expenditure on health care in case of the lethal disease m. In what follows I 
assume a constant elasticity of health care expenditure for that disease with respect to the as-
sociated survival probability. Specifically, in the first period this elasticity will be denoted by 
a parameter  1 , m c :
20  
                                                 
20 Intuitively, health care expenditure for any lethal disease will generally depend upon the outcome, i.e., the 
associated survival probability. In order to economize on notation and since these probabilities remain constant 
for any other lethal disease, this is not taken into account explicitly.    13
(18a)       ( ) { }
()
( ) [ ]
()

















⋅ = ⋅ = . 
Likewise, in every later period t with  1 2 − Ω ≤ ≤ t , one has for every history  t t H h ∈ : 
(18b)     () []
()
( ) [ ]
()





t t m a c
h d e
h d e d
c
h d L






, ⋅ = ⋅ = . 
 
In some contrast to the parameters  t m a , , it is not possible to indicate the sign of the cost pa-
rameters  t m c ,  a priori. More specifically, the sign depends upon the type of technological 
change under consideration. On the one hand, an improvement in the outcome of treatment, as 
given by the higher survival probability, represents a product innovation. On the other hand, 
this may also involve a reduction in the cost of treatment which can be interpreted as a proc-
ess innovation. In the special case  0 , = t m c , the higher quality of treatment is exactly matched 
by cost savings such that overall there is no effect on health care expenditure. However, for 
0 , 〈 t m c  cost savings dominate whereas for  0 , 〉 t m c , the higher quality represents the domi-
nant or perhaps even the only factor. 
 
What is the impact of medical progress upon age-specific expenditure on health care? As in 
the case of mortality, it is again useful to distinguish between two types of effects. For a given 
structure of individuals with respect to history, direct effects upon health care expenditure 
may occur in every period except for Ω. In addition, further changes in expected expenditure 
on health care may arise due to changes in the structure of individuals. As indicated above, 
these tend to increase the share of individuals with the lethal disease m in at least one prior 
period at the expense of individuals who did not catch that disease in the past. Hence, in later 
periods the “new survivors” may cause indirect effects on age-specific health care expendi-
ture.  
 
To be sure, after medical progress has taken place both direct and indirect effects on age-
specific health care expenditure will occur together in the long run because conditions  1 A  
through to  1 − Ω A  hold simultaneously.
21 In particular, expenditure at age t will be affected by 
conditions  1 A  up to  t A , with  1 A  up to  1 − t A  governing the indirect effect and  t A  producing the 
direct effect. Therefore, it should be kept in mind that the distinction between the two types of 
effects introduced above represents but a conceptual device. However, as the analysis below 
will reveal, this is useful in that it leads to a better understanding of how medical progress 
affects age-specific expenditure on health care.  
 
 
                                                 
21 A similar statement applies to direct and indirect effects on age-specific mortality.   14
3.2  Direct effects 
 
In the first period of life, the direct effect of progress on health care expenditure can be de-
rived from (9a) and (18a). Specifically, one obtains: 
(19a)   () [] ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 1 m m m m m m d L d a c d L d d L E d ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ = ρ ρ . 
With no history available for that period, there can be no indirect effect. Thus, (19a) also 
represents the total effect on expected health care expenditure in the first period. 
 
For a later period, one needs to keep the structure of individuals with respect to history in or-
der to be able to identify a direct effect. Thus, the probabilities of the histories conditional 
upon survival remain constant and a similar statement applies to the incidences of health 
states.  
 
Making use of (13c), this implies for the direct effect of progress on health care expenditure: 
(19b)   () [] () () []1 2 ; ; , , − Ω ≤ ≤ ⋅ ≥ = t d H L E d t T d
A
H L E d t m t t t t m
t
t t t ρ . 
 
Next, (13b) and (18b) yield for the change in expected expenditure on health care conditional 
upon the occurrence of the lethal disease m in the current period: 
(19c)     () [] () t m t t t t m t m
t
t m t t t d H L E a c
A
d H L E d , , , , ; ; ⋅ ⋅ = . 
In sum, one obtains for the direct effect in a later period t:
22  
(19d)   () [] () () 1 2 ; ; , , , , − Ω ≤ ≤ ⋅ ≥ ⋅ ⋅ = t d H L E t T d a c
A
H L E d t m t t t t m t m t m
t
t t t ρ . 
 
Not surprisingly, the sign of the parameter  t m c ,  governs the sign of a direct effect. For the size 
of this effect, the incidence of the lethal disease m in the original stationary state turns out to 
be important as well. Intuitively, this can be explained by the fact that a given change in ex-
penditure  ( ) t m t t d H L E , ;  ceteris paribus will have a greater impact on age-specific health care 
expenditure the higher the probability of the associated condition  t m d , . 
 
 
                                                 
22 By construction, this is the change in expected health care expenditure  ( ) t t t H L E  given that the conditional 
probabilities  () t T h P t ≥  remain constant.   15
3.3  Indirect effects 
 
At higher ages, indirect effects upon health care expenditure can turn up because medical pro-
gress influences the probabilities of histories conditional upon survival. As explained above, 
these changes are due to the increase in conditional survival probabilities associated with 
treatment of the lethal disease m in prior periods. Hence, in a later period t in general it is nec-
essary to take into account t-1 indirect effects each relating to a prior period j with 
1 1 − ≤ ≤ t j .  
 
In order to be ready to cope with the potential multiplicity of indirect effects, define a set 
() t t h I  for a history  t t H h ∈  which includes those prior periods in which the lethal disease of 
interest has occurred: 
(20)       (){ } j m j t t t d h t j Z j h I , , ; 1 1 = − ≤ ≤ ∈ = . 
If the history does not contain the event  m d , the individual under consideration has not ex-
perienced the lethal disease m up to now. Hence, the set  ( ) t t h I  will be empty. 
 
With these definitions, it is possible to describe the change in the structure of individuals with 
respect to history at every later age. First, one has for the increase in the unconditional prob-
ability of a history: 




t t h I j
t j m t h P a h P d , . 
In turn, this implies for the associated relative increase in this probability: 











Ceteris paribus, the relative increase becomes bigger the more often the lethal disease m is 
included in a history. 
 
Lemma: For the set  t H  of histories relating to a later period t, one has: 
(22)     ()








j m j t














Consider an arbitrary history  t t H h ∈ ′  which contains the lethal disease m in a prior period j´, 




⎛ ′ ∈ ′
t t h I j . Then, for j=j´, the history  ′
t h  belongs to the set { } j m j t t t d h H h ′ ′ = ∈ , , . 
This shows that each term on the left hand side also appears on the right hand side. Con-
versely, consider an arbitrary prior period j´´ and a history  ″
t h  belonging to the set 




⎛ ″ ∈ ′ ′
t t h I j . Thus, each term of the 
right hand side is also included in the sum on the left hand side.   16
Corollary 1: For the set  t H  of histories relating to a later period t, one has: 
(23)     ()
()






























The proof of corollary 1 relies on the above lemma. First, note the following equivalence: 
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Similarly, one has: 
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, 
with the last equivalence due to the fact that the double sum contains only a finite number of 
terms. 
 
Combining (24a) with (24b) and applying (22), one obtains (23). Corollary 1 will be useful in 
providing another representation of indirect effects on age-specific health care expenditure. 
 
Making use of (22), one obtains for the increase in the probability of surviving for at least t 
periods: 
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This is equivalent to: 
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The impact of medical progress, operating through a prior period j, is due to two factors: 
Apart from the relative increase in the survival probability captured by the parameter  j m a , , the 
size of the effect also depends on the relative frequency of the lethal disease m in the prior 
period j, as evaluated from the perspective of the current period t. The latter factor is repre-
sented by the probability  ( ) t T d h P j m j t ≥ = , , . The product of both factors expresses how the 
“new survivors” of period j contribute to the increase in the probability of survival up to the 
current period t.   17
 
Relying on (21b) and (25b), the relative change in the conditional probability of a history is 
given by: 




( ) [ ]
() () () () t T d h P a a
t T P P
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≥ = ⋅ − ≥ = − ⋅ = ∑ ∑
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− ≤ ≤ ∈
, ,
1 1
, , , , 1 . 
If the history does not include the lethal disease m at all, the conditional probability of a his-
tory must decline. On the other hand, the conditional probability of the history which contains 
the lethal disease in each prior period necessarily increases. For any other history, it is not 
possible to establish the sign of the relative change in its conditional probability in general. 
Ceteris paribus, survival of the lethal disease m in a prior period acts to increase the condi-
tional probability of a history, whereas the occurrence of some other health state in a prior 
period works in the opposite direction.
23  
 
For the change in the conditional probability of a history, one obtains: 
(26b)   () []







≥ ⋅ ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣






, , . 
 
Now it is possible to describe the overall indirect effect on health care expenditure due to 
medical progress in a concise manner. 
 
Proposition 1: Medical progress, as given by (17a), (17b), (18a) and (18b), exerts a total indi-




(27)   () []
1 1 ... − ∧ ∧ t
t t t A A
H L E d  
   () () () [] t t t j m j t t t t j m j t
t
j
j m H L E d h H L E t T d h P a − = ⋅ ≥ = ⋅ =∑
−
=
, , , ,
1
1
, ; . 
 
Using (26b), one obtains from the definition (9c) of expected health care expenditure for a 
later period t:
25  
                                                 
23 Observe that each term, taken by itself, on the right hand side of the last equivalence in (26a), is positive. 
24 By construction, this is the change in expected health care expenditure  ( ) t t t H L E  given that the survival 
probabilities in the current period remain constant. 
25 Since the focus in on indirect effects, the terms  ( ) t t t h L E  remain unaffected.   18
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. 
Making use of (11b), (18) and the lemma, it is possible to transform the first sum as follows: 
(28b)  
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j m j t t t t j m j t j m d h H L E t T d h P a . 
This establishes (27). 
 
For the purpose of interpretation, it is useful to start by looking at the right hand side of (27). 
Each term in brackets corresponds to an indirect effect relating to a prior period. On the one 
hand, its size is influenced by  ( ) t T d h P a j m j t j m ≥ = ⋅ , , ,  and, hence, by the “new survivors” of 
period j, to the extent that they survive up to the current period. On the other hand, the differ-
ence between expected health care expenditures  ( ) j m j t t t t d h H L E , , ; =  and  () t t t H L E  plays an 
important role as well. In particular, it drives the sign of an indirect effect. More specifically, 
the difference is positive if, for a “new survivor” of a prior period j, expected expenditure is 
higher in the current period than for her peers. Likewise, one obtains a negative indirect effect 
if “new survivors” of a prior period j on average consume less health care in the current pe-
riod than individuals of the same age in general. 
 
The intuition for this result on the sign of an indirect effect is straightforward. First, observe 
that medical progress which has taken place at an earlier age j affects the composition of indi-
viduals who survive for at least t periods. Clearly, the rise in survival probabilities associated 
with the lethal disease m at age j produces “new survivors” with respect to age j+1. Some of 
these will not catch a lethal disease at that age and of those who do, some will survive by vir-
tue of assumption (5c). A similar observation applies to each later period up to Ω-1. Thus, 
there will be “new survivors” with respect to every later age including the maximum age Ω. 
In other words, the probabilities  ( ) t T d h P j m j t ≥ = , ,  will be positive for  Ω ≤ 〈 ≤ t j 1.  
 
Second, medical progress relating to a prior age j will affect average expenditure on health 
care at some later age t if and only if it produces “new survivors” with respect to age t who, 
on average, consume a different amount of health care than their peers. Relying on the appro-  19
priate expenditure concepts, this is true if and only if  ( ) j m j t t t t d h H L E , , ; =  differs from 
() t t t H L E .  
 
It is important to note that an indirect effect on age-specific health care expenditure crucially 
depends on average expenditure for “new survivors” relative to average expenditure for all 
individuals of age t. Therefore, the absolute amount of health care consumed by “new survi-
vors” is not really relevant for the sign of an indirect effect relating to a prior age j. In particu-
lar, if either the incidence of lethal diseases or the associated consumption of health care is 
high for the “new survivors” at age t, average health care expenditure at that age may never-
theless decline. Conversely, age-specific expenditure may rise even though health care con-
sumption by “new survivors”, taken by itself, is low. 
 
It is also possible to provide a slightly different representation of the indirect effects due to 
medical progress. As (12) shows,  ( ) t t t H L E  is the expected value of average health care ex-
penditure for individuals of age t whose history satisfies  j m j t d h , , =  and those with  j m j t d h , , ≠ . 
Hence,  ( ) j m j t t t t d h H L E , , ; =  will be higher than  ( ) t t t H L E  if  ( ) j m j t t t t d h H L E , , ; =  is higher 
than  ( ) j m j t t t t d h H L E , , ; ≠  and vice versa.  
 
Drawing on (26b) and noting that  ( ) ( ) 1 , , , , = ≥ ≠ + ≥ = t T d h P t T d h P j m j t j m j t  must hold, one 
obtains for the relative change in the conditional probability of a history: 
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This is equivalent to: 
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Corollary 2: The total indirect effect on expected health care expenditure in a later period due 
to medical progress, as given by (17a), (17b), (18a) and (18b), is equal to:  
 
(30)     () []
1 1 ... − ∧ ∧ t
t t t A A
H L E d  
    () () ⋅ ≥ = ⋅ ≥ ≠ ⋅ =∑
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Using (29b), one obtains from (9c): 
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For the last transformation, both the lemma and corollary 1 have been used. Next, invoke 
(10b) and (11b) to arrive at: 
(31b)     () []
1 1 ... − ∧ ∧ t
t t t A A
H L E d  
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. 
Applying (10d) and (11d), one obtains (30). 
 
Thus, an alternative way to determine the indirect effect relating to a prior period j is to com-
pare  ( ) j m j t t t t d h H L E , , ; =  with  ( ) j m j t t t t d h H L E , , ; ≠ . 
 
Returning to the representation by (27), the total indirect effect on age-specific health care 
expenditure at some age t is given by a weighted sum of the indirect effects relating to each 
prior age. More specifically, the weights are determined by the impact which “new survivors” 
of a prior age exert on the relative increase of the probability of surviving through to age t. 
Hence, in (27) a given difference in brackets contributes more to the total indirect effect if it 
relates to a prior period in which medical progress produces a greater number of “new survi-
vors” up to the age under consideration. This may happen either because progress yields a 
high relative increase in survival probabilities or due to a high probability of the event 
j m j t d h , , =  at the outset.   21
It follows that for the total indirect effect the same qualitative statements apply, mutatis mu-
tandis, as for an individual indirect effect relating to a single prior period. In particular, the 
sign of the total effect is not determined by expected health care expenditure for “new survi-
vors” at the current age either. Rather, the decisive factor is again average expenditure for this 
group relative to all individuals of the same age. E.g., the total indirect effect on age-specific 
health care expenditure at age t may be negative even though “new survivors” at that age, in 
comparison with younger ages, face a high incidence of a lethal disease and require a large 
amount of health care in such a case. However, as (27) shows, this will be true only if the cor-
responding values for all individuals of age t, on average, turn out to be even higher. 
 
As explained above, an indirect effect is solely due to a change in the structure which indi-
viduals of age t exhibit with respect to history. However, this change is but a necessary condi-
tion. In order for an indirect effect on age-specific health care expenditure to actually come 
about, history must have an influence on either the incidence of health status or the associated 
expenditure on health care. To see this more clearly, it is helpful to consider three special 
cases.  
 
Take a single indirect effect relating to a prior age j. As pointed out above, the difference be-
tween  ( ) j m j t t t t d h H L E , , ; =  and  () t t t H L E  determines the sign of this effect while also affect-
ing its size. Relying on (13c) and (16c) and rearranging terms, one obtains the following rep-
resentation: 
(32)     ( ) ( ) t t t j m j t t t t H L E d h H L E − = , , ;  
  () ( ) ( ) [ ] ∑
+
=
− = ⋅ = ≥ =
1
1
, , , , , , , ; ; ; ;
n
k
t k t t t t k j m j t t t t j m j t t k d H L E d d h H L E d h t T d ρ  
    () ( ) () [ ] ∑
+
=
≥ − = ≥ ⋅ +
1
1
, , , , , ; ;
n
k
t k j m j t t k t k t t t t T d d h t T d d H L E ρ ρ . 
Thus, the difference is the sum of two effects, with each effect arising from a comparison of 
“new survivors” of the prior age j with all individuals of age t. First, a treatment expenditure 
effect which will be positive if and only if health care expenditure conditional upon health 
status, on average, is higher for individuals who survived the lethal disease at age j. Second, 
an incidence effect which will be positive if and only if “new survivors” tend to be in those 
health states more often that require a high expenditure on health care as measured by 
( ) t k t t t d H L E , ;.  
 
Consider next the following two sets of conditions: 
(33a)     () ( ) Ω ≤ ≤ = ∈ ∀ = t n k H h d h d t t t k t t k 2 ; ,..., 1 ; ; , , ρ ρ , 
(33b)     () ( ) Ω ≤ ≤ + = ∈ ∀ = t n k H h d L h d L t t t k t t k 2 ; 1 ,..., 1 ; ; , , . 
While (33a) implies that an individual´s history fails to affect the incidence of health status at 
the current age t, (33b) states that history has no influence on health care expenditure condi-
tional upon current health status. These conditions give rise to three important special cases. 
   22
Clearly, (33a) and (33b) imply expected health care expenditure at a later age not to depend 
on history: 
(34a)   ( ) () () () Ω ≤ ≤ ∈ ∀ = ⋅ =∑
+
=
t H h L E d L d h L E t t t t
n
k
t k t k t t t 2 ; ;
1
1
, , ρ . 
This implies average expenditure at age t to be the same for “new survivors” of a prior age j 
and for all individuals: 
(34b)   ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 ; 2 ; ; , , − ≤ ≤ Ω ≤ ≤ = = = t j t L E H L E d h H L E t t t t t j m j t t t t . 
Thus, each difference in (27) is equal to zero. Therefore, medical progress at prior ages has no 
influence at all upon average health care expenditure at age t. 
 
Next, suppose that only (33b) holds. Then, health care expenditure at each age depends upon 
current health status but not on history. Making use of (13b) and (16b), one obtains: 
(35a)     ( ) ( ) ( ) t k t k t t t t k j m j t t t t d L d H L E d d h H L E , , , , , ; ; ; = = = ; 
     Ω ≤ ≤ + = − ≤ ≤ t n k t j 2 ; 1 ,..., 1 ; 1 1.  
Furthermore, (13c) and (16c) imply for the indirect effect relating to the prior age j: 
(35b)   ( ) ( ) t t t j m j t t t t H L E d h H L E − = , , ;  
  () () [] () Ω ≤ ≤ − ≤ ≤ ⋅ ≥ − = ≥ =∑
+
=
t t j d L t T d d h t T d t k
n
k
t k j m j t t k 2 ; 1 1 ; ; ,
1
1
, , , , ρ ρ . 
Hence, the sign of an indirect effect will be determined by the incidence effect alone, i.e., it 
depends on the way in which survival of the lethal disease at the prior age j affects the inci-
dence of health status at the current age. More precisely, the difference is positive if and only 
if, in comparison with their peers, “new survivors” exhibit a higher incidence of those health 
states requiring a high consumption of medical care. 
 
Finally, consider the implications of conditions (33a). From (8b) and (10c), one obtains: 
(36a)     ( ) ( ) ( ) t k t k j m j t t k d t T d d h t T d , , , , , ; ρ ρ ρ = ≥ = = ≥ ; 
This implies: 
(36b)     ( ) ( ) t t t j m j t t t t H L E d h H L E − = , , ;  
  () () ( ) [] Ω ≤ ≤ − ≤ ≤ − = ⋅ =∑
+
=
t t j d H L E d d h H L E d t k t t t t k j m j t t t t
n
k
t k 2 ; 1 1 ; ; ; ; , , , ,
1
1
, ρ . 
 
In this case, the sign of an indirect effect relating to a prior age j only depends on the impact 
which the condition  j m j t d h , , =  exerts, on average, upon expected expenditure conditional on 
health status at current age. More precisely, the effect is positive if and only if, on average, 
survival of the lethal disease m at the prior age j implies an increase in expected health care 
expenditure which is necessary for the appropriate medical treatment of current health status. 
   23
Proposition 2 summarizes the results obtained for the three cases by looking at the total indi-
rect effect upon age-specific health care expenditure. 
 
Proposition 2:  (i) If (33a) and (33b) hold, the indirect effect on age-specific health care ex-
penditure due to medical progress is equal to zero: 
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  (ii) If (33b) holds, the indirect effect on age-specific health care expenditure 
due to medical progress is determined solely by incidence effects: 
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  (iii) If (33a) holds, the indirect effect on age-specific health care expenditure 
due to medical progress is determined solely by treatment expenditure effects: 
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4.  Discussion 
 
With the distinction between direct and indirect effects, the analysis has identified two types 
of effects due to medical progress which will usually affect age-specific expenditure on health 
care simultaneously.
26 More specifically, it is perfectly possible for these effects to differ in 
sign such that no general conclusions with respect to their relative size are available. Thus, a 
positive direct effect is neither necessary nor sufficient for an increase in age-specific health 
care expenditure. Conversely, a negative indirect effect does not imply a reduction in age-
specific expenditure or vice versa. 
 
In addition, the analysis provides sufficient conditions for the change in age-specific expendi-
ture on health care to exhibit a definite sign. E.g., suppose that the improvement in the treat-
ment of a lethal disease at current age involves a higher cost and that “new survivors” of prior 
ages on average consume more health care than their peers. Then, there must be an increase in 
age-specific expenditure on health care at current age. 
 
                                                 
26 The exceptions being the first period (no indirect effect) and the maximum period (no direct effect).   24
With respect to other cases, the model highlights those variables which are significant for an 
assessment of the sign and the size of direct and indirect effects, respectively. Clearly, this is 
important for the evaluation of the change in age-specific health care expenditure. In addition, 
it leads to a better understanding of the impact of “new survivors” upon which a substantial 
part of the literature has focussed: The age profile of per capita health care expenditure may 
shift upward even though “new survivors”, on average, involve lower expenditure than their 
peers. 
 
E.g., this may happen when the following conditions are met: Suppose that “new survivors” 
constitute only a small part of all individuals in each age group. As demonstrated above, this 
implies the probabilities  () t T d h P j m j t ≥ = , ,  to be low in each case. In addition, take the lethal 
disease to involve a high incidence  ( ) t T d t m ≥ , ρ  at each age. Based on these assumptions, one 
obtains the following description of the lethal disease: At any given age, a sizeable part of all 
individuals catches the disease. However, only a small number survives the disease.
27  
 
Similarly, it is also conceivable that medical progress leads to a downward shift of the age 
profile for health care expenditure even though “new survivors”, on average, consume a 
higher amount of resources than their peers at each age. Given that indirect effects on age-
specific expenditure now are positive by assumption, this can only happen if the change in 
treatment of the lethal disease involves a reduction in cost such that direct effects are suffi-
ciently negative. Again, this scenario appears to be more likely for lethal diseases with a high 
incidence and a low survival probability at each age. 
 
These considerations can also be used to argue that there is no necessary link between either 
compression of morbidity or expansion of morbidity and the change in age-specific expendi-
ture on health care. If aging of the population is driven by medical progress, any change in 
age-specific morbidity must be due to the influence of “new survivors”. Thus, both compres-
sion and expansion of morbidity will produce indirect effects, albeit of different sign, on the 
age profile of health care expenditure.
28 However, due to the presence of direct effects, the 
sign of the total effect will remain ambiguous in general. It follows that a downward shift of 
the age profile may occur even though an expansion of morbidity takes place. Similarly, com-
pression of morbidity is not sufficient to prevent an upward shift in age-specific consumption 
of health care. 
 
At any given age, direct effects on age-specific health care expenditure are caused by indi-
viduals who suffer from the lethal disease. On the other hand, indirect effects are associated 
with individuals who have survived the same disease at some prior age. Upon closer inspec-
tion, there is another important distinction between the two types of effects. By definition, 
medical progress creates new knowledge, but its contents as well as its price are unknown a 
priori. Hence, the sign of a direct effect can only be determined after progress has taken place. 
In contrast, it is usually possible to evaluate the sign of an indirect effect beforehand. More 
                                                 
27 Conversely, with no change in the sign of either a direct or an indirect effect, the total effect may also turn out 
to be negative. More precisely, this could happen if progress would relate to a lethal disease with low age-
specific incidence and high survival probabilities at each age. 
28 More generally, as the analysis undertaken above shows, the sign of an indirect effect on health care expendi-
ture depends on a number of factors. Ceteris paribus, a rise (a decline) in age-specific incidence of lethal diseases 
can safely be taken to imply a negative (a positive) indirect effect.   25
precisely, this is true whenever at the outset at least some individuals already survive the le-
thal disease under consideration.
29 For a later age, a simple comparison of per capita expendi-
ture on health care expenditure between “new survivors” and their peers supplies the required 
information. 
 
Observe that it is not possible to infer the sign of an indirect effect from the evolution of age-
specific expenditure on health care for “new survivors” alone. Essentially, the reason is that 
individuals who survived a given lethal disease in a prior period constitute but part of all indi-
viduals who are alive at a later age. For the sake of illustration, consider two successive ages 
j+1 and j+2. In addition, suppose that age-specific health care expenditure rises with age, i.e., 
( ) ( ) 1 1 1 2 2 2 + + + + + + 〉 j j j j j j H L E H L E . Turning to “new survivors” of the lethal disease m at age j, 
average expenditure is given by  ( ) j m j j j j j d h H L E , , 1 1 1 1 ; = + + + +  and  ( ) j m j j j j j d h H L E , , 2 2 2 2 ; = + + + + , 
respectively. Specifically, assume  ( ) ( ) j m j j j j j j m j j j j j d h H L E d h H L E , , 2 2 2 2 , , 1 1 1 1 ; ; = 〈 = + + + + + + + + , 
i.e., average expenditure on health care for “new survivors” is taken to rise with age as well. 
Under these conditions, it is perfectly possible that the indirect effects on age-specific health 
care expenditure turn out to be negative, i.e., that the two inequalities 
( ) ( ) i j i j i j j m j i j i j i j i j H L E d h H L E + + + + + + + 〈 = , , ;  are satisfied for i=1,2. More precisely, this will 
be the case whenever individuals who did not suffer from the lethal disease at age j on aver-
age consume a higher amount of health care at later ages than “new survivors”. 
 
Furthermore, changes in the incidence of lethal diseases within the population provide no reli-
able guide to the change in age-specific health care expenditure. To be specific, suppose that 
the incidence of each lethal disease rises with age. Thus, for two successive ages i and i+1 as 
well as an arbitrary lethal disease k one has  ( ) ( ) i T d i T d i k i k ≥ 〉 + ≥ + , 1 , 1 ρ ρ . In addition, as-
sume that the incidence of each lethal disease among “new survivors” of a lethal disease m at 
some prior age j is just equal to the average incidence for all individuals. Thus, for a later age 
t and an arbitrary lethal disease, one obtains  ( ) ( ) t T d d h t T d t k j m j t t k ≥ = = ≥ , , , , ; ρ ρ . 
 
Given these assumptions, there is no incidence effect of medical progress. However, due to 
aging, the incidence of each lethal disease within the population at large has risen. For the 
sign of an indirect effect on age-specific health care expenditure, the impact of surviving the 
lethal disease at some prior age on the expected cost of treatment now turns out to be deci-
sive.
30 More specifically, a negative treatment effect implies the indirect effect on age-specific 
health care expenditure to be negative.
31 With a direct effect that is sufficiently small, one 
obtains a negative total effect on age-specific expenditure. Therefore, medical progress may 
imply a downward shift of the age profile of health care expenditure even though the inci-
dence of lethal diseases within the population has increased.
32  
                                                 
29 However, as (22) indicates, in order to be able to determine the size of an indirect effect on health care expen-
diture, knowledge of the (relative) increase in survival probabilities is an essential prerequisite. For obvious 
reasons, this will be available only ex post, i.e., after medical progress has taken effect. 
30 Cf. (26b). 
31 Clearly, the opposite conclusion holds for a positive impact. 
32 Empirical research is needed in order to determine the relevance of such a case. The argument only shows that 
there is no necessary link between a change in the incidence of a lethal disease within the population and the 
change in the age profile for health care expenditure.   26
The model of the present paper can also be used to evaluate the traditional approach to fore-
casting health care expenditure. As a first result, note that medical progress may drive aging 
of the population without any change in the age profile of health care expenditure. E.g., this 
will be the case if both direct and indirect effects are equal to zero, respectively, at every age. 
Thus, the traditional approach does not necessarily exclude the impact of medical progress. 
Rather, it can be taken to incorporate – albeit implicitly – a specific hypothesis with respect to 
the relationship between a reduction in age-specific mortality and the associated total effect 
upon health care expenditure. 
 
Second, if only the direct effects of medical progress are equal to zero, it is still possible to 
employ the traditional approach in a useful manner. However, in this case the approach only 
indicates the change in health care expenditure due to “first round” effects while it fails to 
take into account those “second round” effects relating to the impact of “new survivors”. 
Hence, in order to obtain the overall change in future health care expenditure, it is necessary 
to supplement the traditional approach by an evaluation of the change in the age profile due to 
the indirect effects of medical progress. More specifically, as explained in section 3.3, this 
requires a comparison of average health care expenditure for “new survivors” and their peers. 
 
In any other case, it does not make sense to rely on the traditional approach when assessing 
the impact of medical progress on health care expenditure. Essentially, this holds true because 
it is not clear which part of the total effect is already taken into account by the approach. In 
particular, the traditional approach fails to provide a lower bound on the evolution of future 
health care expenditure since it excludes the possibility of a downward shift of the profile of 
age-specific expenditure on health care. 
 
The analysis undertaken in the present paper also sheds light on the hypotheses mentioned in 
the introduction. More precisely, it is possible to identify conditions such that the change in 
age-specific health care expenditure associated with each hypothesis is brought about by 
medical progress. For the compression of morbidity and the expansion of morbidity, this has 
already been demonstrated above. In addition, aging of the population may go along with a 
steepening of the age profile of health care expenditure. For the sake of illustration, suppose 
that the increase in survival probabilities relating to the lethal disease m fails to produce any 
indirect effect. Furthermore, take average expenditure associated with treatment of that dis-
ease to increase with age, i.e., assume  ( ) ( ) t m t t t t m d H L E t T d , , ; ⋅ ≥ ρ  to be an increasing function 
of t. Next, let the parameters  t m c ,  relating to medical progress be positive such that  t m t m c a , , ⋅  
is non-decreasing with respect to age t. Under these conditions, (19d) implies a rate of growth 
for age-specific health care expenditure which increases with age, i.e., a steepening of the age 
profile. 
 
Finally, the model lends considerable support to a critical view of the costs of dying approach. 
It is true that medical progress leads to a reduction in age-specific mortality. However, taken 
by itself, this will not imply substantial reductions in age-specific health care expenditure as 
hypothesized by the approach. The reason is simple: Expenditure on health care relates to 
treatment of diseases in the first place, and not to the outcome of treatment. Thus, for every 
homogenous group of individuals who die at the end of a given period, there will be a similar 
group of survivors – albeit usually of different size – with the same amount of per capita ex-  27
penditure on health care.
33 As long as medical progress has an influence on the outcome of 
treatment but not on the incidence of a lethal disease, any hope for a reduction in age-specific 
health care expenditure due to the reduction in age-specific mortality seems ill-founded. 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
Although the analysis undertaken above is purely theoretical, it may also serve as a guide to 
empirical investigations of the impact of medical progress on age-specific health care expen-
diture. It is true by definition that progress creates new knowledge which cannot be known in 
advance. This could be taken to imply that there is no way today of assessing the influence of 
progress which occurs tomorrow on future health care expenditure.  
 
However, as the model presented in this paper clearly demonstrates, such a claim would be 
unnecessarily negative. More specifically, consumption of health care by individuals who 
survive a lethal disease today provides valuable information on the indirect effects of future 
medical progress on age-specific health care expenditure. In this sense, empirical data on “old 
survivors” are available today and can be used to assess at least part of the impact of progress 
which may take place in the future. In particular, the model suggests that empirical research 
should focus on the incidence of lethal diseases and the treatment costs for “old survivors” in 
relation to their peers. 
 
Like any other theoretical analysis, the model excludes a number of potentially important as-
pects. While this is the price to pay in order to be able to derive precise results, it is important 
to bear these limitations in mind. E.g., the model certainly implements a somewhat restricted 
version of medical progress. More precisely, progress may also improve the quality of life of 
individuals not suffering from a lethal disease. Next, and potentially more important, the 
analysis offers a mechanical view of the way in which progress affects age-specific expendi-
ture on health care: Progress just happens and there is no explicit consideration of decisions 
taken by individuals, insurers or other parties. 
 
While the last observation is true, I do not think that it has substantial implications for the 
analysis undertaken in this paper. To see this, suppose that medical progress is made available 
for individuals according to some decision process. In this more general setting, the economy 
in the long run presumably will again tend to reach some kind of equilibrium such that the age 
profile of health care expenditure remains constant. Hence, adding economic substance by 
including decisions on the type of medical progress, certainly will have implications on both 
population aging and the evolution of health care expenditure. However, in order to assess the 
impact of progress on age-specific health care expenditure, it is nonetheless necessary to pro-
ceed precisely in the manner outlined above. Or, to put it slightly differently: While the model 
set up in this paper does not provide an explanation of medical progress, it is designed to cap-
ture all relevant effects on the age profile of health care expenditure. Therefore, its value 
should be judged according to this more moderate goal. 
                                                 
33 More precisely, apart from the outcome of treatment of the same lethal disease, the survivors are identical to 
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